A Hospital Is Hit by Ransomware. What Happens in the First Six Hours of Response?

A interview with Shane Mathew, Founder & CEO of Riffle Resilience
A hospital ransomware response requires more than containing an attack and restoring technology. Shane Mathew explains how he would advise hospital leaders to protect patient care, make difficult operational decisions, and prepare for an extended IT outage.

The Call Nobody Wants
It's 8:15 a.m. on a Tuesday.
A large hospital system has detected what appears to be a ransomware attack. The cybersecurity team is investigating, and some systems may need to be disconnected to contain the threat.
The emergency department is busy. Surgeries are underway. Clinics are seeing patients. Nurses are administering medications, physicians are ordering tests, and patients are waiting for results.
Nobody knows how far the attack has spread or how long the disruption might last.
The CEO turns to the leadership team and asks:
"What do we need to do right now?"
This is where hospital ransomware response becomes more than a cybersecurity issue. While IT works to contain the threat, hospital leaders must decide how to maintain safe clinical operations, even when critical technology is unavailable or cannot be trusted.
We put this hypothetical scenario to Shane Mathew, Founder and CEO of Riffle Resilience, to explore how he would advise a healthcare organization during the first six hours.
This is an illustrative, scenario-based interview, not an account of an actual hospital incident. The timeframes are approximate, and actions may occur simultaneously depending on the circumstances.
Shane, you've just received that call. What's the first thing you would do?
First 15 minutes
Shane: My first question would be simple: What does IT know about the threat, and what does clinical leadership know about its impact on patient care?
Those are two separate questions, and both need attention immediately.
The CISO and cybersecurity team need to manage the technical response. That may involve isolating affected systems, investigating the scope of compromise, and preventing further damage.
My concern would be what's happening on the hospital side.
Does clinical leadership understand the situation? Do hospital administrators and nursing leaders know what could happen next? If IT disconnects a major system in the next ten minutes, does anyone know what that means for patient care?
I'd recommend establishing a direct connection between the cybersecurity incident command and hospital operations leadership immediately.
I'd also make sure we have a clear understanding of who can authorize downtime procedures, restrict clinical services, or activate the hospital's emergency operations structure.
The first priority isn't to solve everything. It's to get the right people making the right decisions together.
Would you immediately tell the hospital to activate downtime procedures?
First 15–30 minutes
Shane: Not automatically.
If clinical systems are functioning and IT has authorized their continued use, I wouldn't unnecessarily disrupt patient care.
But there's an important distinction between a system that's available and one that's trustworthy.
During a ransomware incident, an application might still be running while the underlying environment is being investigated. The cybersecurity team needs to determine whether that system can continue to be used safely.
In the meantime, I would have operational leaders take a few precautions.
Make sure department leaders know what's happening. Ask them to locate their existing downtime procedures and supplies. Verify that they can communicate with their supporting departments if normal systems become unavailable.
And be very clear that nobody should create unauthorized workarounds, reconnect restricted systems, or start exporting sensitive patient information without approval.
Preparing for downtime doesn't mean activating downtime.
You can take reasonable precautions while continuing normal operations. But if clinical information becomes unreliable or a critical capability fails, leaders must act based on patient safety, even if the cybersecurity investigation is still underway.
What would you focus on during the first hour?
First 30–60 minutes
Shane: I'd want to understand which critical clinical workflows are still functioning and which ones could fail next.
Most organizations instinctively begin asking departments whether they're operational.
Is Pharmacy up? Is Laboratory up? Is Radiology working?
Those questions matter, but they're incomplete.
Let's take the laboratory as an example.
A clinician orders a test. Someone identifies the patient, collects the specimen, transports it, performs the test, validates the result, and communicates that result back to the treating clinician.
That's an end-to-end clinical workflow. Several departments and systems are involved.
The laboratory equipment might be operational, but if the ordering system or result communication process fails, we still have a patient care problem.
I'd ask hospital leadership to focus on a small number of essential workflows:
Patient registration, identification, admissions, and movement.
Medication ordering, verification, dispensing, and administration.
Laboratory test ordering through result delivery.
Diagnostic imaging and clinical interpretation.
Emergency, critical care, and other time-sensitive services.
For each, I'd want three answers:
What's working right now? What would stop working if critical technology disappeared? And do we have a safe, approved alternative?
I wouldn't ask for a comprehensive readiness assessment. I would ask for a short operational picture that leadership can use immediately.
What if the hospital hasn't adequately prepared for an extended IT outage?
First 60–90 minutes
Shane: That's where things become difficult.
Many hospitals have downtime procedures, paper forms, and emergency supplies. But those resources are often designed around relatively short technology interruptions.
A ransomware event may create a very different situation.
What happens if the electronic health record is unavailable for several days? What if automated medication systems, laboratory interfaces, or communications are also affected?
Having a paper medication form doesn't necessarily mean Nursing and Pharmacy can safely manage the entire medication administration process.
Similarly, having a laboratory requisition doesn't tell us how specimens will be tracked, how critical results will be delivered, or how clinicians will know those results were received.
A paper form isn't a complete downtime procedure.
If the hospital hasn't prepared for these situations, I wouldn't attempt to build an entirely new continuity program during the attack.
Instead, I'd want each critical department to identify what it can actually do safely, using available staff, resources, and approved procedures.
Where a safe fallback doesn't exist, that limitation needs to reach operational leadership immediately.
That may mean restricting certain activities, prioritizing urgent patients, or making arrangements for care elsewhere.
The worst thing we can do is assume a manual process will work simply because somebody wrote it down.
When would you recommend restricting clinical services?
Hours 1–2
Shane: I'd want that discussion happening before we're forced to make the decision.
Hospitals have a natural tendency to keep everything running as long as possible. I understand that. Nobody wants to cancel procedures, turn away patients, or divert ambulances.
But we have to be realistic about what the organization can safely support.
If essential diagnostic services are impaired, what does that mean for surgeries? If medication verification becomes difficult, which treatments can safely continue? If patient information is unavailable, what activities introduce unacceptable clinical risk?
These are operational decisions, not simply IT decisions.
I'd recommend that medical, nursing, hospital operations, and ambulatory leadership begin identifying services in three general categories:
Services that must continue. Emergency care, critical care, and other time-sensitive treatment that cannot safely be delayed.
Services that may continue with restrictions. Activities that remain safe at reduced volume or with additional staffing, controls, or approved alternatives.
Services that could be deferred or redirected. Elective procedures and appointments where postponement would not create unacceptable patient risk.
Any actual service restriction must be authorized through the hospital's clinical and emergency operations leadership.
And I wouldn't wait until a department is completely unable to function before discussing those decisions.
The goal isn't to keep every service running at any cost. It's to preserve the care the hospital can deliver safely.
What would concern you most as departments begin operating manually?
Hours 2–3
Shane: The handoffs between departments.
I've spent a lot of time looking at hospital downtime procedures, and this is one of the areas where problems can become serious very quickly.
A department may have an internal workaround, but what happens when that work has to move to another department?
Consider medication administration.
A physician writes an order. How does that order reach Pharmacy? How is it verified? How does the medication get to the nurse? How is administration documented so another clinician doesn't give the same medication again?
Now think about laboratory results.
A specimen is collected and tested. How does the result get back to the right physician? How are critical results communicated and acknowledged? How do we know that nothing was lost along the way?
During normal operations, technology performs much of that coordination automatically.
When those systems disappear, people have to take over.
I'd have operational leaders focus on those critical handoffs and establish who is responsible for sending, receiving, acknowledging, and tracking essential clinical information using approved methods.
Where the process cannot be performed safely, that needs to be escalated rather than improvised.
I'd also make sure we have working alternative communications. That could include approved radios, independent telephone lines, emergency pagers, or designated runners, depending on the organization's available resources.
Patient safety during EHR downtime depends on more than having access to paper.
The entire clinical workflow must still function, including the steps between departments.
IT is beginning recovery. How would you help determine what should come back first?
Hours 3–4 and continuing
Shane: This is where I think traditional recovery planning often falls short.
Imagine bringing all the department leaders into a room and asking which applications are critical.
Pharmacy says its systems are critical. Laboratory says the same. Patient Administration, Radiology, Nursing, and Finance all have legitimate reasons why their systems need to come back.
But knowing that an application is critical doesn't automatically tell us what to restore first.
The real question is:
What combination of capabilities will allow us to restore an essential clinical service?
For example, restoring a laboratory application may not accomplish much if the hospital still lacks network access, identity services, functioning workstations, interfaces, or a reliable way to communicate results.
An application can be technically restored while the clinical workflow remains unavailable.
This is where I'd work with operational and clinical leadership to define the most important services and identify what those services depend on.
Those dependencies become valuable input into the ransomware recovery priorities established by IT.
But I'd emphasize one important rule: Operational priorities never override cybersecurity containment or the requirement to restore trusted systems.
The cybersecurity and IT recovery teams determine what can safely return. Clinical leadership helps determine which safe restoration options deliver the greatest patient care benefit.
That's a much more useful conversation than asking every department to submit its list of critical applications.
Six hours have passed. What would you want leadership to have accomplished?
Hours 4–6
Shane: I wouldn't necessarily expect the technology problems to be resolved.
But I would expect leadership to have a much clearer understanding of the hospital's operating position.
At a minimum, I'd want to know:
Which critical clinical services are operating normally, operating under restrictions, or unavailable?
What patient safety concerns have been identified, and who is managing them?
Which existing downtime capabilities are actually usable?
What decisions have been made about services, staffing, communications, and patient movement?
What information does IT need from clinical operations to help establish restoration priorities?
I'd want one shared operational picture rather than different departments independently reporting that they're doing fine.
And I'd already be thinking about the next shift.
If this lasts another twelve hours, do we have enough staff? What about supplies? Are manual processes becoming slower or less reliable? Are backlogs accumulating? How will we reconcile clinical documentation and orders when systems return?
This is an important part of healthcare ransomware response that doesn't always receive enough attention.
A workaround that works for two hours may not be safe or sustainable for two days.
Before the first six hours end, leadership should have established the next operational priorities, the individuals responsible for them, and when the situation will be reassessed.
What's the biggest mistake hospital leaders should avoid during a ransomware attack?
Shane: Treating the event entirely as an IT problem.
IT and cybersecurity have an enormous responsibility during a ransomware attack. They need to contain the threat, protect the environment, investigate what happened, and restore trusted technology.
But hospital leadership has another responsibility that is just as important.
They have to determine how patient care continues while that work is happening.
That means understanding which services matter most, where existing downtime procedures may be insufficient, which clinical handoffs are at risk, and when operations need to be restricted.
I also think leaders need to be comfortable acknowledging what they don't know.
If a manual process hasn't been tested, don't call it ready. If a department can't safely operate without a particular system, recognize that limitation and make a decision.
You don't need every answer immediately.
But you do need the right people communicating, a clear understanding of your immediate risks, and a process for making decisions as conditions change.
The first question isn't how quickly IT can restore the systems. It's how we keep caring for patients safely until they do.
What This Means for Hospital Cyberattack Preparedness
The first six hours of a ransomware attack expose something that traditional disaster recovery planning doesn't always address.
Restoring technology and maintaining hospital operations are related, but they aren't the same thing.
Hospital downtime procedures need to account for the clinical workflows that cross departments, the resources that enable those workflows, and the operational decisions required when safe care can no longer continue normally.
That is why long-term IT outage preparedness must go beyond the electronic health record.
Hospitals need to understand which services they must preserve, how long available alternatives can operate safely, and what conditions require changes to their service posture.
These capabilities are difficult to develop in the middle of a crisis.
They need to be built before one.
How Downtime by Riffle Helps Hospitals Prepare
Downtime by Riffle helps hospitals and health systems strengthen their readiness for prolonged technology disruptions, including those caused by ransomware.
Our advisory approach focuses on the operational challenges that appear when technology becomes unavailable for days rather than minutes.
This includes assessing existing downtime capabilities, developing practical hospital-wide and ambulatory workflows, improving downtime materials and communications, and establishing an operational framework for activation, escalation, and service decisions.
We also help healthcare leaders understand the dependencies connecting critical clinical services to the technology and resources required to sustain them.
The goal isn't simply to produce more plans.
It's to make prolonged clinical downtime something a healthcare organization can actually manage.
Learn more about Downtime by Riffle and our approach to long-term healthcare IT outage preparedness.
About Shane Mathew
Shane Mathew, CBCP, MPH, is the Co-founder and CEO of Riffle Resilience. He has more than 20 years of experience helping organizations improve business continuity, disaster recovery, and operational resilience.
His work in healthcare focuses on helping hospitals and health systems prepare for extended technology disruptions by connecting clinical workflows, critical dependencies, downtime procedures, and operational decision-making.
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